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Detector-device-independent quantum key distribution (ddiQKD) held the promise of being robust
to detector side-channels, a major security loophole in QKD implementations. In contrast to what
has been claimed, however, we demonstrate that the security of ddiQKD is not based on post-
selected entanglement, and we introduce various eavesdropping strategies that show that ddiQKD
is in fact insecure against detector side-channel attacks as well as against other attacks that exploit
device’s imperfections of the receiver. Our attacks are valid even when the QKD apparatuses are
built by the legitimate users of the system themselves, and thus free of malicious modifications,
which is a key assumption in ddiQKD.
Introduction.—Quantum key distribution (QKD), a tech-
nique to distribute a secret random bit string between
two separated parties (Alice and Bob), needs to close
the gap between theory and practice [1]. In theory,
QKD provides information-theoretic security. In prac-
tice, however, it does not because QKD implementation
devices do not typically conform to the theoretical mod-
els considered in the security proofs. As a result, any
unaccounted device imperfection might constitute a side-
channel which could be used by an eavesdropper (Eve)
to learn the secret key without being detected [2–12].
To bridge this gap, various approaches have been
proposed recently [13–17], with measurement-device-
independent QKD (mdiQKD) [17] probably being the
most promising one in terms of feasibility and perfor-
mance. Its security is based on post-selected entangle-
ment, and it can remove all detector side-channels from
QKD implementations, which is arguably their major
security loophole [3–10, 12]. Also, its practicality has
been already confirmed both in laboratories and via field
trials [18–24]. A drawback of mdiQKD is, however,
that it requires high-visibility two-photon interference
between independent sources, which makes its implemen-
tation more demanding than that of conventional QKD
schemes. In addition, current finite-key security bounds
against general attacks [25] require larger post-processing
data block sizes than those of standard QKD.
To overcome these limitations, a novel approach, so-
called detector-device-independent QKD (ddiQKD), has
been introduced recently [26–29]. It avoids the prob-
lem of interfering photons from independent light sources
by using the concept of a single-photon Bell state mea-
surement (BSM) [30]. As a result, its finite-key security
∗ shihan.sajeed@gmail.com
bounds and classical post-processing data block sizes are
expected to be similar to those of prepare-and-measure
QKD schemes [31]. Despite this presumed promising per-
formance, however, the robustness of ddiQKD against
detector side-channel attacks has not been rigorously
proven yet, and only partial security proofs have been
introduced [26, 27].
Here, we show that, in contrast to what has been
claimed [26–29], the security of ddiQKD cannot rely on
the same principles as mdiQKD (i.e., post-selected en-
tanglement). More importantly, we demonstrate that
ddiQKD is in fact vulnerable to detector side-channel
attacks and to other attacks that exploit imperfections
of the receiver’s devices. These attacks are valid even
when Alice’s and Bob’s state preparation processes are
fully characterised and trusted, an essential assumption
in ddiQKD. Moreover, they do not require that Eve sub-
stitutes Bob’s detectors with a measurement apparatus
prepared by herself to leak key information to the chan-
nel [32]. That is, our attacks apply as well to the scenario
where Alice and Bob build the QKD devices themselves.
mdiQKD & ddiQKD.—Let us start by reviewing the ba-
sic principles behind mdiQKD and ddiQKD. To simplify
the discussion, we shall assume that Alice and Bob have
at their disposal perfect single-photon sources. Note,
however, that both schemes can operate as well, for in-
stance, with phase-randomised weak coherent pulses in
combination with decoy states [33–35].
An example of a possible implementation of mdiQKD
is illustrated in Fig. 1(a) [17]. Both Alice and Bob gener-
ate BB84 states [36] and send them to an untrusted relay
Charles. If Charles is honest, he performs a two-photon
BSM that projects the incoming signals into a Bell state.
In any case, Charles has to declare which of his measure-
ments are successful together with the Bell states ob-
tained. Alice and Bob then extract a secret key from
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FIG. 1: Possible implementations of
partially-device-independent QKD with linear optics.
(a) mdiQKD [17]. PBS, polarising beamsplitter; BS,
50 : 50 beamsplitter; and Di, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
Charles’ single-photon detectors. (b) ddiQKD [27].
HWP, half-wave plate; and PM, phase modulator. One
single click in the detector D1, D2, D3, or D4
corresponds to a projection into the Bell state |Ψ+〉,
|Φ+〉, |Ψ−〉, or |Φ−〉 respectively (see main text for
further details). In both schemes, the grey areas denote
devices that need to be characterised and trusted. Also,
Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories need to be protected
from any information leakage to the outside.
those successful events where they used the same basis.
Importantly, if Charles is honest, his BSM measurement
post-selects entanglement between Alice and Bob, and,
therefore, he is not able to learn any information about
their bit values. To test whether or not Charles is honest,
Alice and Bob can simply compare a randomly chosen
subset of their data to see if it satisfies the expected cor-
relations associated to the Bell states announced. That
is, mdiQKD can be seen as a time-reversed Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen QKD protocol [37]. Therefore, its se-
curity can be proven without any assumption on the be-
haviour of Charles’ measurement unit.
ddiQKD [26–29] aims to follow the same spirit of
mdiQKD. The key idea is to replace the two-photon BSM
with a two-qubit single-photon BSM [30]. This requires
that Alice and Bob use two different degrees of freedom
of the single-photons to encode their bit information. In
so doing, one avoids the need for interfering photons
from independent light sources. An example of a pos-
sible implementation is illustrated in Fig. 1(b) [27] (see
also [26, 28, 29] for similar proposals). Here, Alice sends
Bob BB84 polarisation states: (|H〉+eiθA |V〉)/√2, where
|H〉 (|V〉) denotes the Fock state of a single-photon pre-
pared in horizontal (vertical) polarisation, and the phase
θA ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}. Bob then encodes his bit infor-
mation by using the spatial degree of freedom of the in-
coming photons. This is done with a 50 : 50 beamsplitter
(BS) together with a phase modulator (PM) that applies
a random phase ϕB ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} to each input sig-
nal. Finally, Bob performs a BSM that projects each in-
put photon into a Bell state: |Φ±〉 = (|H〉 |u〉±|V〉 |l〉)/√2
and |Ψ±〉 = (|H〉 |l〉 ± |V〉 |u〉)/√2, where |u〉 (|l〉) repre-
sents the state of a photon that goes through the up-
per (lower) arm of the interferometer (see Fig. 1(b)). A
photon detection event (“click”) in only one detector Di
corresponds to a projection on a particular Bell state.
Both mdiQKD and ddiQKD require that Alice’s and
Bob’s state preparation processes are characterised and
trusted. This is indicated by the grey areas shown in
Fig. 1. In ddiQKD, the elements inside Bob’s grey area
can be regarded as his trusted transmitter (when com-
pared to mdiQKD). Among the trusted components there
are elements which belong to the BSM, but, importantly,
the detectors Di do not need to be trusted.
The security of ddiQKD is not based on post-selected
entanglement.—At a first sight, it seems that the secu-
rity of ddiQKD follows directly from that of mdiQKD,
given, of course, that the assumptions on Alice’s and
Bob’s state preparation processes are fulfilled [26–29].
That is, it relies on the fact that the BSM post-selects
entanglement between Alice and Bob. A first indication
that confronts this idea was given recently in [32]. There,
it was shown that, in contrast to mdiQKD, ddiQKD is
actually insecure if Eve is able to replace Bob’s detectors
with a measurement apparatus that leaks information
to the channel [32]. Although this result is important
from a conceptual point of view, it violates one of the
security assumptions of ddiQKD: Bob’s detectors have
to be built by a trusted party (but do not need to be
characterised) to avoid that they intentionally leak key
information to the outside [26]. Below we show that even
in this scenario, the security of ddiQKD cannot be based
on post-selected entanglement alone, unlike mdiQKD.
For this, we will consider a slightly simplified version of
the ddiQKD scheme illustrated in Fig. 1(b). In particu-
lar, we will assume that Bob’s receiver has only one active
detector, say for instance the detector D1, while the other
detectors are disabled. That is, now Bob’s BSM projects
the incoming photons only into the Bell state |Ψ+〉. If
the security of ddiQKD is based on post-selected entan-
glement, this modification should not affect its security
(only its secret key rate is reduced by a factor of four), as
a projection into a single Bell state should be sufficient
to guarantee security [17]. Next we show that a blinding
attack [6, 8] renders ddiQKD insecure in this situation.
In particular, suppose that Eve shines bright light onto
Bob’s detector D1 to make it enter linear-mode opera-
tion [6, 8]. In this mode the detector is no longer sensi-
tive to single-photon pulses, but it can only detect strong
light. In order to simplify the discussion, we shall as-
sume that D1 always produces a click (no click) out-
come when the mean photon number µ of the incom-
ing pulses satisfies µ ≥ µth (µ < µth) for a certain
3TABLE I: Mean photon number of the input light to
Bob’s detectors as a function of the phases φE and ϕB.
(a) φE = 0
ϕB D1 D2 D3 D4
0 µ µ 0 0
pi
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
pi 0 0 µ µ
3pi
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
(b) φE =
pi
2
ϕB D1 D2 D3 D4
0 µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
pi
2
µ 0 0 µ
pi µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
3pi
2
0 µ µ 0
(c) φE = pi
ϕB D1 D2 D3 D4
0 0 0 µ µ
pi
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
pi µ µ 0 0
3pi
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
(d) φE =
3pi
2
ϕB D1 D2 D3 D4
0 µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
pi
2
0 µ µ 0
pi µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
µ
2
3pi
2
µ 0 0 µ
threshold value µth. Once D1 is blinded, Eve performs
an intercept-resend attack on every signal sent by Al-
ice. That is, she measures Alice’s signals in one of the
two BB84 bases (which Eve selects at random for each
pulse), and she prepares a new signal, depending on the
result obtained, that is sent to Bob. Intercept-resend at-
tacks correspond to entanglement-breaking channels and,
therefore, they cannot lead to a secure key [38]. Suppose,
for instance, that the signals that Eve sends to Bob are
coherent states of the form
∣∣√2µ〉 with creation opera-
tor a† = (a†H + e
iφEa†V)/
√
2. Here, a†H (a
†
V) denotes the
creation operator for horizontally (vertically) polarised
photons, and the phase φE ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} depends
on Eve’s measurement result. More precisely, for each
measured signal, Eve sends Bob a coherent state pre-
pared in the BB84 polarisation state identified by her
measurement. Then, it can be shown that the state at
the input ports of Bob’s detectors Di is a coherent state
of the form (see Appendix A for details)
|ψ〉 =
∣∣∣∣√µ2 (eiφE + eiϕB)
〉
D1
⊗
∣∣∣∣√µ2 (1 + ei(φE+ϕB))
〉
D2
⊗
∣∣∣∣√µ2 (eiφE − eiϕB)
〉
D3
⊗
∣∣∣∣√µ2 (1− ei(φE+ϕB))
〉
D4
.
(1)
This situation is illustrated in Table I, where we show
the mean photon number of the incoming light to Bob’s
detectors for all combinations of φE and ϕB. Most impor-
tantly, from this table we can see that if D1 is the only ac-
tive detector and Eve selects µ such that µ/2 < µth < µ,
then Bob can only obtain a click when he uses the same
measurement basis as Eve (i.e., when ϕB, φE ∈ {0, pi}
or ϕB, φE ∈ {pi/2, 3pi/2}). That is, this attack does
not introduce any error. Moreover, we have that Bob
and Eve select the same basis with at least 1/2 proba-
bility. This means that the ddiQKD scheme illustrated
in Fig. 1(b) (with only one active detector) is actually
insecure against the detector blinding attack for a total
system loss beyond only 3 dB, just like standard QKD
schemes. This confirms that the security of ddiQKD can-
not be based on post-selected entanglement. The same
conclusion applies as well to the ddiQKD schemes intro-
duced in Refs. [26], [28], and [29].
Insecurity of ddiQKD against detector side-channel
attacks.—If Bob uses four active detectors, the detec-
tor blinding attack has one main drawback: it produces
double-clicks [32]. From Table I one can already see that
whenever Bob uses the same measurement basis as Eve
there is always two detectors that click. For instance,
when ϕB = φE = 0 the detectors D1 and D2 always
click, and similar for the other cases. This means that
Alice and Bob could, in principle, try to monitor double-
clicks to detect the presence of Eve. So, the question is
whether or not four active detectors can make ddiQKD
secure again. As we show below, the answer is “no”. For
this, we introduce two possible eavesdropping strategies
that exploit practical imperfections of Bob’s detectors to
avoid double-clicks. See also Appendix B for two alter-
native attacks that achieve the same goal by exploiting
other imperfections of Bob’s linear optics network.
The first eavesdropping strategy uses the fact that
single-photon detectors respond differently to the same
blinding power PB. This has been recently analysed in
Ref. [39]. There, the authors compare the response of
two single-photon detectors in a commercial QKD sys-
tem Clavis2 [40] to varying blinding power. They first il-
luminate the detectors with continuous-wave bright light
of power PB to force them enter linear-mode operation.
Then they record the maximum and minimum value of
the trigger pulse energy ET for which the click proba-
bilities are 0 and 1 respectively. The results are shown
in Fig. 2(a) [39]. For a particular blinding power PB,
each point in the solid (dashed) curves shown in the fig-
ure represents the maximum (minimum) value of trigger
pulse energy ET for which the detection efficiency ηdet is
0 (1). The blue and green colours identify the two de-
tectors. Next, we show how this effect could be used to
avoid double-clicks.
For this, we return to the blinding attack described
above against the ddiQKD implementation illustrated in
Fig. 1(b). For simplicity, let us consider again the case
where ϕB = φE = 0. In particular, suppose for instance
that Eve wants to force a click only on detector say D1,
and no click on detector D2. Then, in order to achieve
this goal, she can simply choose a combination of PB
and ET such that the detector D1 (D2) has a non-zero
(zero) click probability. If the behaviour of the detector
D1 (D2) corresponds to the green (blue) curves shown
in Fig. 2(a), then the values PB ≈ 0.2 mW and ET ≈
0.1 pJ constitute an example that satisfies this criterion.
Similarly, if PB ≈ 0.56 mW and ET ≈ 0.19 pJ, then
Eve could make the detector D2 (D1) to have a non-
zero (zero) click probability. Importantly, note that when
Bob’s basis matches that of Eve, only two out of the four
detectors Di might produce a click (see Table I). Hence,
in these instances Eve only needs to avoid double-clicks
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FIG. 2: Detector click probability in bright-light
blinded regime in commercial QKD system Clavis2.
(a) Click trigger thresholds versus blinding power PB
for two different single-photon detectors D1 and D2.
Here, for a particular blinding power PB, each point in
the solid (dashed) curves represents the maximum
(minimum) value of trigger pulse energy ET for which
the detection efficiency ηdet is 0 (1). The experimental
data has been reprinted from Ref. [39]. (b) Measured
detection efficiency mismatch in the time domain
between two blinded single-photon detectors at
PB = 0.32 mW, ET = 0.24 pJ, and 0.7 ns wide trigger
pulse (see main text for further details).
between two detectors in order to remain undetected. A
similar argument can be applied as well to any other value
of ϕB and φE.
This attack demonstrates that if Bob’s detectors are
uncharacterised, as assumed in ddiQKD, this type of
schemes are indeed insecure against detector side-channel
attacks. That is, Eve could learn the whole secret key
without producing any error nor a double-click.
A second eavesdropping strategy that also allows Eve
to avoid double-clicks is based on a time-shift attack [3, 4]
that exploits the detection efficiency mismatch between
Bob’s detectors. In this type of attack, Eve shifts the
arrival time of each signal that she sends to Bob such
that only one detector can produce a click each given
time. Here, we have confirmed experimentally that this
type of attack is also possible with blinded detectors.
For this, we blinded two single-photon detectors from the
commercial QKD system Clavis2 [40] and we measured
their detection efficiency mismatch. The experimental
results are shown in Fig. 2(b). We find, for instance,
that whenever Bob receives a trigger pulse at the time
instance T1 (T2), only the detector D1 (D2) can produce
a click because this instance is outside of the response
region of the detector D2 (D1). That is, by combining the
time-shift attack with the blinding attack introduced in
the previous section, Eve could again break the security
of ddiQKD without introducing errors nor double-clicks.
Conclusion.—We have analysed the security of detector-
device-independent QKD (ddiQKD), a novel scheme that
promised to be robust against detector side-channel at-
tacks. We have shown that its security is not based on
post-selected entanglement, as originally claimed. Most
importantly, we have presented various eavesdropping at-
tacks that demonstrate that ddiQKD is actually vulner-
able to detector side-channel attacks as well as to other
side-channel attacks that exploit imperfections of Bob’s
receiver. These attacks are valid even when Alice’s and
Bob’s state preparation processes are fully characterised
and trusted, and Bob’s detectors are built by a trusted
party and cannot be replaced with a measurement device
manufactured by Eve.
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Appendix A: Quantum state |ψ〉 at the input ports
of Bob’s detectors
In this Appendix, we present the calculations to derive
Eq. (1). To simplify the discussion, we have labeled dif-
ferent modes involved in the calculations in Fig. 3. Sup-
pose that the input state in mode a is a coherent state∣∣√2µ〉
a
with creation operator a† = (a†H + e
iφEa†V)/
√
2.
Also, suppose that the input signal in mode b is the vac-
uum state |0〉b. Then, the output signal in modes c and
d, after the action of the 50 : 50 beamsplitter (BS), is
given by
∣∣√µ〉
c
⊗ ∣∣√µ〉
d
, where c† = (c†H + e
iφEc†V)/
√
2
and d† = (d†H + e
iφEd†V)/
√
2 denote the corresponding
creation operators for modes c and d.
Next, we consider the phase modulator (PM) and the
half-wave plate (HWP) that act on modes c and d. The
former performs the unitary transformation c† = eiϕBe†,
where e† is the creation operator at the output port of
the PM. The HWP applies the unitary transformation
d†H = f
†
V and d
†
V = f
†
H, where f
†
H and f
†
V denote the
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FIG. 3: Schematic representation of Bob’s ddiQKD
receiver. The different modes a, b, c, d, e, f , g, and k
correspond to those considered in the calculations of
Appendix A; the receiver scheme is otherwise identical
to Fig. 1(b) [27].
creation operators at the output port of the HWP. This
means, in particular, that the quantum state in modes e
and f has the form∣∣√µeiϕB〉
e
⊗ |√µ〉f , (A1)
with the creation operators e† and f† given by e† = (e†H+
eiφEe†V)/
√
2 and f† = (eiφEf†H + f
†
V)/
√
2, respectively.
Then, after applying the 50 : 50 BS on modes e and f ,
we have that the output state in modes g and k can be
expressed as
exp
{√
µ
2
[(
eiφE − eiϕB)g†H + (1− ei(φE+ϕB))g†V
+
(
eiφE + eiϕB
)
k†H +
(
1 + ei(φE+ϕB)
)
k†V
]}
|0〉 .
(A2)
Finally, if we apply the polarising beamsplitters (PBS)
(which we assume reflect horizontally polarised light and
let vertically polarised light pass) on modes g and k, we
find that the state |ψ〉 at the input ports of Bob’s de-
tectors Di, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, is a tensor product of
coherent states given by Eq. (1).
Appendix B: Side-channel attacks against Bob’s
linear optics network
One main assumption of ddiQKD is that Bob’s linear
optics network [i.e., the grey area within Bob’s receiver
in Fig. 1(b)] is fully characterised and trusted. Note,
however, that this does not mean that its devices need
to be perfect, as this would be impossible to achieve in
practice. In this Appendix we show that Eve could also
exploit various typical imperfections of Bob’s linear op-
tics to avoid double clicks when performing the blinding
attack described in the main text.
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FIG. 4: Normalised energy at the input ports of Bob’s
detectors Di as a function of φE, when ϕ¯B = pi/2.
(a) Ideal scenario with a perfect PM that has ∆ϕB = 0.
(b) Example of a practical case where ∆ϕB = pi/36 [41].
The normalised energy is defined as the energy divided
by the energy of a coherent state with mean photon
number µ. See text for further details.
In particular, we will analyse two possible eavesdrop-
ping strategies in this context. In the first one, Eve
uses the fact that Bob’s PM ϕB is usually not per-
fect. More precisely, we study the situation where Bob’s
PM actually applies a phase ϕB = ϕ¯B + ∆ϕB , where
ϕ¯B ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} and the parameter ∆ϕB charac-
terises the imperfection. In this scenario, Eve can select
her phase φE = φ¯E + ∆φE , where φ¯E ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}
and ∆φE > 0 is a deviation term that Eve can select to
control the detectors. According to Eq. (1), the energy
at the input ports of Bob’s detectors D1, D2, D3 and
D4 is proportional to, respectively,
µ
2 [1 + cos (φE − ϕB)],
µ
2 [1 + cos (φE + ϕB)],
µ
2 [1 − cos (φE − ϕB)], and µ2 [1 −
cos (φE + ϕB)]. For simplicity, below we focus on the case
ϕ¯B = pi/2. The other cases can be analysed similarly. We
consider first the ideal scenario where ∆ϕB = 0. The re-
sulting normalised energies are illustrated in Fig. 4(a) as
a function of φE. That is, as already seen in the main
text, when Eve’s basis matches that of Bob, then two
detectors receive maximum energy and, therefore, both
click. If Bob and Eve use different bases then the to-
tal energy is equally distributed to all the four detec-
tors and, given that ET is chosen carefully, none of them
click. Suppose now the practical scenario where Bob’s
state preparation is imperfect and ∆ϕB is equal to say,
for instance, pi/36 (or 5◦, which is a typical accuracy in
practical systems [41]). In this situation, the energy dis-
tributions shift with respect to each other as highlighted
6in Fig. 4(b). If φ¯E = pi/2 and Eve selects say ∆φE = pi/18
(∆φE = −pi/18) then the energy at the input ports of
detectors D1 and D4 is, respectively, E+ ∝ 0.998µ and
E− ∝ 0.982µ (E− and E+). Similarly, if φ¯E = 3pi/2 the
energy at the detectors D2 and D3 is, respectively, E−
and E+ (E+ and E−). That is, if Eve chooses carefully a
suitable value of ∆φE and µ such that 0.998µ ≥ µth and
0.982µ < µth, she can guarantee that only one detector
clicks each given time, and no double-click is produced.
Finally, in the second eavesdropping strategy that we
analyse we consider the situation where ∆ϕB = 0, but
Eve exploits the fact that Bob’s BSes are not perfect
to avoid double-clicks. Although a 50 : 50 BS designed
to operate at a certain wavelength (say, for example, at
1550 nm) can achieve nearly perfect splitting ratio at that
wavelength, its splitting ratio can vary significantly at a
different wavelength. For instance, a custom-made beam-
splitter sample studied in Ref. [42] exhibited an extreme
behaviour with splitting ratio of 98.6 : 1.4 (0.3 : 99.7) at
1470 nm (1290 nm). While commercial beamsplitter
models may exhibit less variation, Eve in general can to
some extent control the splitting ratio by simply chang-
ing the wavelength of the signals [42], and this could be
used to avoid double-clicks.
In particular, suppose that Eve’s signals are in a wave-
length such that the splitting ratio of Bob’s first (second)
BS is t1 : 1 − t1 (t2 : 1 − t2). In addition, suppose that
the creation operator of Eve’s coherent states
∣∣√2µ〉 is
now given by a† = (
√
γa†H + e
iφE
√
1− γa†V), where the
parameter γ is chosen by Eve. In this scenario, it can be
shown that the state at the input ports of Bob’s detectors
Di is a coherent state of the form
|ψ〉 =
∣∣∣∣α(√tˆ1tˆ2γˆeiφE +√t1t2γeiϕB)〉
D1
⊗
∣∣∣∣α(√tˆ1tˆ2γ +√t1t2γˆei(φE+ϕB))〉
D2
⊗
∣∣∣∣α(√tˆ1t2γˆeiφE −√t1tˆ2γeiϕB)〉
D3
⊗
∣∣∣∣α(√tˆ1t2γ −√t1tˆ2γˆei(φE+ϕB))〉
D4
, (B1)
where xˆ = 1 − x, and α = √2µ. Note that when t1 =
t2 = γ = 1/2 we obtain Eq. (1).
This means that, in principle, Eve might select the pa-
rameter γ and the wavelength of her signals such that the
resulting splitting ratios t1 and t2 make the input energies
at Bob’s detectors asymmetric. In so doing, and follow-
ing a similar argumentation to the one introduced in the
previous eavesdropping strategy, Eve can guarantee that
when she and Bob choose the same basis, only one de-
tector clicks. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 5 for a
particular example where ϕB = pi/2, t1 = 0.44, t2 = 0.46,
and γ = 0.2. In this scenario, we find that the maximum
normalised energy at the input ports of Bob’s detectors
D1 and D4 when Eve selects φE = pi/2 is, respectively,
0.96 and 0.87. Similarly, when she chooses φE = 3pi/2 the
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FIG. 5: Normalised energy at the input ports of Bob’s
detectors Di as a function of φE, when ϕB = pi/2. Here
we assume that the splitting ratio of Bob’s first
(second) BS is 44 : 56 (46 : 54), and Eve’s state
parameter γ = 0.2. See text for further details.
maximum normalised energy at the detectors D3 and D2
is, respectively, 0.9 and 0.84. Therefore, Eve can choose
the energy of her signals such that only the detector D1
(D3) clicks when φE = pi/2 (φE = 3pi/2). That is, by
changing the values of the parameters t1, t2, and γ, Eve
can guarantee that only one detector clicks each given
time.
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